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Failure Repurposed:  
In February 2014, the Science Gallery at Trinity College Dublin curated an 
exhibition entitled ‘Fail Better’ which told the stories of ‘beautiful, heroic and 
instructive failures’ (Science Gallery, 2014). Quite appropriately, the original 
manuscript pages of Samuel Beckett’s Worstward Ho were displayed so visitors could 
see the development of his famous motto: ‘Ever Tried. Ever Failed. No Matter. Try 
Again. Fail Again. Fail Better.’ With the exception of a few instances of total failure 
(e.g. a centrifugal birth machine to spin mothers around and cause their babies to ‘fly’ 
out of the womb), the exhibition focused entirely on the stories of failure that eventually 
led to successful scientific and/or technological inventions. For example, James Dyson, 
the industrial designer who invented the bag-less Dyson vacuum cleaner, explained how 
it ‘took him 5,127 prototypes to develop the final machine, each failed prototype 
informing the next one’ (Dyson, 2014). Other designers, inventors and scientists 
detailed their own stages of failure before finally arriving at a successful final product 
(e.g. the Raspberry Pi computer, the K1 disposable syringe, and the suspension on a 
Formula 1 Ferrari) (Science Gallery, 2014). As the curators made clear, they were 
interested in the positive aspects of failure – ‘the role of failure in stimulating creativity: 
in learning, in science, engineering and design’ (Science Gallery, 2014). This 
understanding of failure as instructive is currently flourishing in places like Silicon 
Valley where Beckett’s original motto has been re-booted into the mantra of Start Up 
companies: ‘Fail fast, fail early, fail often’. For investors, entrepreneurs, and software 
developers, failure is now absolutely central to inventing and commercializing new 
technologies (Basulto, 2012; Schumpeter, 2011). Rather than an experience to be 
avoided, failure is now understood as the key to success:  
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The entrepreneurial fashion for failure … is not really 
concerned, as Beckett was, with failure per se—with the 
necessary defeat of every human endeavour, of all efforts at 
communication, and of language itself—but with failure as an 
essential stage in the individual’s progress toward lucrative self-
fulfilment. Failure, in the #failbetter sense, is something to be 
embraced and celebrated, to be approached with a view to 
understanding how it might most effectively be transmuted into 
success (O’ Connell, 2014). 
By jettisoning the dark clutches of an absurd and unforgiving universe – the usual 
Beckettian milieu – entrepreneurs, scientists, inventors, researchers, policy-makers, 
athletes and artists are repurposing the ‘Fail Better’ motto as an inspirational rallying 
cry. Indeed, Beckett’s quotation is available on mouse pads, iphone cases, tee-shirts, 
mugs, keychains, fridge magnets, and on a variety of motivational posters with tasteful 
frames and designer fonts. Swiss tennis player Stan Wawrinka has it tattooed on his left 
forearm. Stripped of its original misanthropic overtones, this repurposed account of 
#failbetter has made its way outside of Silicon Valley and is currently shaping 
organizational change in government, science, higher education, business, media, and 
the military (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Cannon & Edmunson, 2005). Embedded in 
this transformation is a particular kind of resilient disposition needed to withstand the 
experience of failure and turn it into success: an inexhaustible spirit of hard work, an 
ability to reflect on the difficulties you encounter, the willingness to learn from your 
mistakes, and the determination to overcome hardship and misfortune. We should not 
be surprised, then, that #failbetter is currently energizing Neoliberal leaders across the 
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world who encourage employees, citizens and consumers to cultivate resilience so they 
can ‘bounce-back’ from failure.  
Seeking to recover some of the darkness of Beckett’s original claim, this paper 
contests the repurposing of failure into a singularly positive and instructive experience. 
It illustrates the reductive nature of this success / failure logic and seeks to develop a 
more heterogeneous and poly-vocal understanding of failure. I am particularly 
interested in failure’s capacity to disrupt, re-work, surprise and deconstruct accepted 
modes of thinking and knowing – precisely the kind of energies Beckett was pondering 
in his invocation to fail better. He was not interested in those rare examples of failure 
that result in fruitful or even emancipatory new paradigms; indeed, even these have 
darkness within. Rather, he revelled in the much more common experiences of failure as 
permanent, painful and often unspeakable. I want to explore the political possibilities 
that emerge in that Beckettian terrain and ask whether a more heterogeneous account of 
failure might help contest the closures, exclusions and violence currently underscoring 
our political imaginaries.  
This critical reimagining of failure has relevance across a range of pressing 
global issues, including our collective failures to address climate change, structural 
economic inequality and entrenched forms of violence. In this paper, I focus on and 
hope to develop a body of recent critical scholarship that has begun to think 
productively about the significance of failure for global politics; specifically, the failure 
of sophisticated border security technologies to accurately distinguish between that 
which is safe (e.g. normal, recognized, welcome) and that which is dangerous (e.g. 
deviant, other, unwelcome) (Amoore, 2011; 2013; Amicelle, Aradau & Jeandesboz, 
2015; De Goede & Randalls, 2009; Leese, 2015; Magnet, 2011; Salter, 2014). This 
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work illustrates how the blunt norm / deviant distinction driving border decisions cannot 
account for the diversity of behaviours and appearances presented for inspection, with 
the result that techno-scientific designations of unwanted bodies (e.g. irregular migrants, 
asylum seekers, refugees) and dangerous goods (e.g. explosives, poisons, drugs) end up 
reproducing prevailing social exclusions such as race, gender, class and sexuality 
(Amoore & Hall, 2009; Browne, 2010; Magnet, 2011; Vukov, 2016; Wilcox, 2015: 
104-130). Of particular interest to me in this body of work are examinations of the way 
failure is pre-emptively built into border security technologies. For example, adaptive 
algorithms autonomously utilize their own failures to learn, correct and re-tune so as to 
better track the changing nature of norm / deviant in real time (Amoore, 2009; Amoore 
& Pioyukh, 2016; Amoore & Raley, 2017; Aradau & Blanke, 2015; Hall, 2018). In 
focusing on pre-emptive decision making, this literature asks challenging questions 
about who/what is actually making decisions at the border (the machine? the border 
guard?); where that decision is generated (the border crossing? the Cloud? the 
algorithm?); and who/what is therefore responsible when these decisions go wrong. 
Elongating border decisions in this way insists that to fully open the ‘black box’ of 
border security technology it is necessary to scrutinize the antecedent register of 
research and development – the life-worlds of technoscience where border security 
technologies are built and tested (Bourne, Johnson & Lisle, 2015).  
This paper spatially transposes insights about pre-emptively organized 
technological failure at the border back into the laboratories where such border 
technologies are built. While it aligns with critical analyses of how software developers 
pre-emptively imagine, construct and implement border decisions when designing 
algorithms (Amoore, 2013; Amoore & Raley, 2017; Hall, 2018), this paper asks a more 
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general question about how an instructive account of failure governs behaviour, 
relations, progress and outcomes in the antecedent border space of the laboratory. How 
do the congregation of experts engaged in the collective practice of developing a border 
security technology understand the possibilities and consequences of failure? How do 
they understand success? To what extent do their everyday practices in scientific 
laboratories proceed by repeated failures? Are there some failures that are acceptable in 
the course of research and development and others that are not? Who decides which 
failures matter and which don’t, and how is that decision policed? To address these 
questions, this paper draws from an ethnographic study of a multi-sited, multinational 
and multi-institutional EU-funded project entitled Handhold (Handhold, 2012). 
Handhold was one of several projects that received European funding to develop a 
portable, integrated device to detect CBRNE threats at borders that would be used ‘by 
European customs agencies, border guards, first responders, police, civil security or 
others operating in potentially hostile environments’ (Handhold, 2012). The overall goal 
of this device was to eventually replace the sniffer dog currently used in places like 
airports and sea ports. I was part of a team that was able to observe the work of 
Handhold up-close to gain insight into how technology develops in a security context 
(TRUST, 2013).1 We conducted multi-sited ethnographies, observations and interviews 
of the 9 major Handhold partners, and interacted with scientists, engineers, developers, 
entrepreneurs, managers and end-users from five different European countries. We were 
involved in Handhold throughout the central phase of its development, including the 
                                                            
1 The ‘Tracing Risk and Uncertainty in Security Technologies’ (TRUST) project ran from March 2013‐ 
October 2014. Working collectively and informed largely by Latour’s (2005) approach to technology, five 
of us followed the Handhold project to see how the human and non‐human actors collaborated 
together (TRUST, 2013). References to the TRUST interviews and observations are as follows: ENDU 
refers to End User interview; FOBS refers to Field Observation; MOBS refers to Meeting Observation; 
MREF refers to Meeting Reflections; and SE refers to Scientist / Engineer interview.  
6 
 
important prototype test halfway through the project’s lifespan. To get a broader sense 
of how Handhold functioned within a wider security context, we also interviewed UK 
government scientists, engineers and managers who work at the interface of science, 
security and technology.  
Throughout these investigations, I became interested in the strange and elusive 
accounts of failure articulated by funders, civil servants, scientists, engineers, 
entrepreneurs and end-users. Failure was simultaneously everywhere and nowhere: it 
drove practice and behaviour with a silent force, but it was seldom articulated in any 
tangible way. The more time I spent observing Handhold, the more I was able to discern 
a powerful consensus about what kind of failure is deemed acceptable – and even 
desirable – during the design and building of a border security technology. 
Overwhelmingly, the construction of the Handhold device was governed by an 
instructive account of failure that resonated with the Science Gallery’s 2014 narrative: 
the participants in Handhold wanted to fail better. I’m particularly interested in the 
normative infrastructure embedded in that desire, and the way it governs scientific 
practice and imagination. During my observations of Handhold, I was struck by the 
linear, unidirectional and progressive learning trajectory that underscored this dominant 
understanding of failure and shaped the way scientists and engineers did their work. All, 
to a greater or lesser degree, obeyed the formula of ‘experiment →fail →adapt →learn 
→re-try →succeed’, and thus reaffirmed the story of scientific progress that is always 
told in hindsight: ‘I failed in this way, several times, but then I adapted, learned, and my 
failures ultimately ended in success’. Reflecting on the Science Gallery’s account of 
#failbetter, I came to think of this formula as ‘the Dyson narrative’.  
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Using the construction of the Handhold device as a case study, this paper shows 
how an instructive account of failure (and the singular trajectory of learning embedded 
within it) governs the daily routines of scientists and engineers building the device, 
helps them avoid the ‘wrong’ kind of failures, and encourages them to pursue the ‘right’ 
kind of success. While not wishing to disavow this task, I am – rather unsurprisingly – 
more interested in the failure of this instructive account of failure to govern scientific 
practice and imagination. I want to look at all the disturbing, awkward, surprising, 
disruptive, unexpected, painful and difficult experiences of failure that did not map onto 
the Dyson narrative. Part of the problem with an exclusive focus on the disciplining 
character of instructive failure is that it silences the creative agency of the scientists and 
engineers on Handhold. Certainly these figures were governed by an instructive account 
of failure, and spent enormous amounts of energy and emotional labour trying to live up 
to its dictates. But they were also irritated by it, reflexive about its power, and often 
emboldened to disobey its regulations. It was precisely these moments of resistance that 
allowed me to glimpse a subterranean universe of multiple failures that kept bubbling 
up in the everyday work of the Handhold participants. Indeed, I became fascinated with 
the disobedience of the scientists and engineers, and the alternative experiences of 
failure that their impiety made visible.  
To explore the experiences of failure that do not fit the Dyson narrative, I draw 
from excellent critical work in Science, Technology and Society (STS) that deconstructs 
the myth of science as rational, ordered and instrumental (Barad, 2007; Haraway, 2016; 
Mol, 2003; Latour, 1979, 1987). By paying close attention to how the complex life-
worlds of scientists-in-action are intimately entangled with their materials, tools and 
methods, this literature reveals the idiosyncratic, unexpected and thoroughly messy 
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ways that science actually solves problems. This critical framework is necessary for my 
analysis of Handhold because it enables me to think about the agency of failure – the 
work that it does in the world to guide practice, change behaviour, re-calibrate relations, 
alter materialities and mobilize futures. Using STS as a guide, then, this paper unfolds 
by examining how an instructive account of failure – the Dyson narrative – is obeyed 
and contested in the daily practices of research, discovery and collaboration as scientists 
and engineers struggle to build a border security device. I’m particularly interested in 
how non-productive experiences of failure made themselves felt at every stage in 
Handhold’s development, leaking into the daily practices of scientists and engineers, 
shaping the manner in which they calculated risk, and haunting their relentless pursuit 
of innovation. Telescoping out of the specific case of Handhold, I end the paper by 
asking how more heterogeneous accounts of failure such as those articulated by creative 
artists might open up new political possibilities for thinking about science, security, 
technology and borders. These artful insights offer important clues for how we might 
conceptualize scientific failure outside of the Dyson narrative and instead attune 
ourselves to Beckett’s insistence that failure can never be solved, overcome or 
dispensed with.  
 
Unacknowledged Failure: the everyday practice of science 
Failure is currently animating an important debate within scientific communities 
as they discuss the need to talk more openly about their failures and share data from 
failed experiments so that others will not repeat the same mistakes (Firestein, 2015; 
Vallery, 2016; Zaringhalam, 2016). Given the widespread nature of this debate, I 
expected to hear the Handhold scientists and engineers talk openly about their 
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experiences of failure. What surprised me in the interviews and observations was that 
the centrality of failure to scientific practice was so widely accepted that it operated as 
common sense: it was both omnipresent and almost entirely unacknowledged. Indeed, 
Handhold participants met my questions about failure with expressions of surprise, 
bafflement and confusion. Why was I even interested in failure? Why does it matter? 
Why would I even want to know about it? This bewilderment was curious rather than 
hostile: for scientists and engineers, failure is simply an intrinsic part of everyday 
practice (i.e. you experiment, you fail, you adapt, you learn, you re-try and then 
hopefully you succeed). As one senior scientist / engineer with extensive experience on 
defence and security related projects explained: ‘The usual approach of a scientist...is to 
fail, yeah? Success is a summation, an addition of failure... the standard process is 
failures’ (SE22). Another scientist / engineer happily explained the routine process of 
continuously writing, failing and re-writing the project software as ‘good practice’: ‘I 
expected it to be like this… this is the normal life of things’, and after laughing quietly 
for a moment; ‘technology never works when you want it to’ (SE5). Similarly, a quite 
junior scientist / engineer demonstrated how the routinization of failure in everyday 
practice was the only way to make progress: ‘sometimes it works, sometimes it 
doesn’t… if something doesn’t work you have still learned something, and you can help 
others’ (SE6). The omnipresence of failure in the building of the Handhold device 
meant that even when it was at the prototype stage, all the participants expected it to 
fail. As one senior scientist / engineer wearily explained: ‘No matter how hard you try 
something always goes wrong, because it is technology’ (SE23; MREF5). For the 
scientists and engineers of Handhold, failure was so deeply embedded in their daily 
routines and practices that it effectively disappeared from view. To make any progress 
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at all on their part of the device, all of them accepted a large degree of failing along the 
way; indeed, they understood failure as one of the principle drivers for learning, 
adaptation, solution and innovation.  
In observing and listening to the scientists and engineers on Handhold, it became 
clear that their common sense understanding of failure was very much the Dyson 
narrative: they accepted failure because it would eventually lead to success. To try and 
dig underneath that common sense view, I became interested in research experiences on 
Handhold that disrupted this overly instructive pathway of failure. In other words, I 
started thinking about the mistakes, dead-ends, stupid ideas, whims, unrealized dreams, 
wasted efforts, false steps, aborted trajectories and breakdowns that nobody talks about. 
Some of that silence was broken during discussions about research publications. All 
scientists and engineers on the project, from the most senior Professor to the most junior 
PhD student, were very candid about how they actively wrote out non-productive 
failures from their published results (SE1; SE2; SE6). It wasn’t that the troubling, 
difficult and often painful mistakes that constitute the messy ground of scientific 
exploration were absent from this project; it was that these awkward experiences were 
deliberately evacuated from the published record because they did not fit the Dyson 
narrative. This reveals some of the active work that an instructive account of failure 
actually does in constituting the epistemological horizon of ‘normal science’: the only 
missteps that appear are those that can be retrospectively narrated through the linear 
‘experiment →fail →adapt →learn →re-try →succeed’ trajectory which results in 
‘inevitable’ success. This singularized trajectory is further strengthened by the 
institutionalized structures of recognition that the scientists and engineers of Handhold 
labour under (e.g. promotion, more research funding, commercial rewards). You don’t 
11 
 
make full Professor with a litany of half-formed projects and unrealized ideas, despite 
the fact that the careers of all scientists and engineers – indeed, of all academics and 
scholars – are constituted by multiple mistakes that don’t lead anywhere, dead-ends that 
produce no results, stupid ideas that sit in unopened files, and wasted efforts that 
produce feelings of shame and embarrassment. So while I want to draw attention to the 
widespread consensus over instructive failure that governed the work of Handhold’s 
scientists and engineers, I also want to show that many other experiences of failure were 
always stubbornly present in ways that troubled the productive stories they were able to 
tell about the project.  
This singularized account of instructive failure was also disrupted by the many 
different ways that each participant group understood failure, and how these competing 
views came into conflict. While all participants understood that the project as a whole 
would fail if they did not have a working prototype of the device at the halfway point 
(with the ultimate threat that the EU would pull funding), each professional culture 
operated under different understandings of failure that were often in competition with 
each other (MOBS7; SE1; SE2; SE4). For example, scientists and engineers based in 
university laboratories understood their own professional failure as not publishing 
original and innovative peer-reviewed work in top- quality journals with high impact 
factors. Conversely, those based in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) understood 
failure as not effectively commercializing, spinning out or patenting a new product 
(SE9; SE15). The EU and UK managers coordinating research into security 
technologies had a very broad taxonomy of failure which included a device that lacked 
innovation, provided poor value for money, took too long to construct, did not result in 
widely disseminated research findings, and had limited impact in scientific and 
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government circles (GOV1; GOV6; MREF2)2. These competing multiplicities of failure 
also emerged in technical negotiations over the device itself, for example, in discussions 
about sensor accuracy and how many false negatives or false positives would be 
tolerated (SE2). These very technical accounts of failure became the focus of obsessive 
discussions between scientists and engineers about thresholds – of what an acceptable 
level of failure might be (MOBS3; MOBS5). However, while scientists and engineers 
understood failure through highly granular and labile thresholds, end-users were very 
blunt about what constitutes failure: if a device cannot produce accurate, reliable and 
instantaneous readings, it is quickly discarded (ENDU1; ENDU2). Many times 
throughout the project, end-users jokingly referred to the legendary ‘cabinets of horror’ 
– the storage cupboards in customs depots, border crossings and industry headquarters 
all over the world that are full of detection technologies that have been enthusiastically 
acquired and then angrily rejected (SE1; MREF3; ENDU1).  
Such diverse and competing understandings of failure were further mobilized 
through judgements about the quality of the research itself, often with reference to 
supposedly universal standards of what ‘good quality’ scientific research entails. For 
example, some of the technical work produced in advance of the prototype test was 
deemed to be ‘disappointing’ by some participants (MREF8), while the ‘dummy data’ 
provided by one work package (sensor development) to help speed up the progress of 
another (software) was seen as lacking and even ‘half baked’ (SE2; SE4; SE7; SE24). 
Often, complex negotiations over the sequencing of failure (e.g. ‘if you can’t get your 
sensor to work, then I can’t build the necessary software’) resulted in accusations that 
                                                            
2 Given that all national, regional and international governing bodies adhere to well-established 9-stage 
‘Technology Readiness Levels’ (TRLs), it would be interesting to trace the extent to which such a rigid 
taxonomy of device ‘readiness’ maps onto the instructive formation of failure discussed here (Horizon 
2020, 2015).  
13 
 
those at the latter end of the sequential chain (e.g. those waiting for dummy data or a 
hardware platform) were not ‘pulling their weight’ (SE4; SE10; SE11; SE15; MREF1; 
MREF6). This culture of judgement exacerbated the different cultural, national and 
institutional norms about when to admit that something was not working. For example, 
the early stages of each Handhold consortium meeting were characterised by partners 
hiding their lack of progress, or addressing difficulties only in terms of changing 
parameters of success. Failures, mistakes and accidents were only revealed in the more 
technical discussions later on when project leaders tried to bring the different aspects of 
the device together (MOBS3; MOBS4; MOBS5; MREF1).  
When these multiple understandings of failure came into conflict through 
accusations and judgements, engineers often externalized the reasons and 
responsibilities for failure in highly inventive ways. Most often, failure was displaced 
out of the human realm and onto the device itself – failure was the fault of the 
technology, the recalcitrance of the basic materials (e.g. the chemicals), and the 
limitations of what scientific laws actually permit. If they were not blaming the device 
itself, Handhold scientists and engineers turned their attention to non-technical actors 
within the project. For example, during preparation for the prototype demonstration, the 
scientists and engineers gathered around the device – at that point the size of a large 
shoe-box – and recalled their initial claim that it would be small enough to ‘fit in your 
pocket’ or ‘hang on your belt’. Whilst laughing at their own initial hubris, they were 
quick to claim that these early fantasies were the fault of funders and governments who 
(a) had unrealistic expectations of what the project could achieve; and (b) failed to 
understand the limits of the technologies and methods being deployed (MOBS6). In 
other words, ‘it was their failure, not ours’. Similarly, failure was often displaced onto 
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the non-expert end-user – in this case the border guard who was imagined as a rather 
undexterous, unintelligent, boorish figure who could not possibly understand how to 
‘properly’ use such a sophisticated technical device (MOBS6; Bourne, Johnson & Lisle, 
2015: 319-20). In a project relying on intense collaboration, however, these internal 
displacements of failure were repressed when co-operation was required in front of the 
EU funders (MOBS2; MOBS6; MOBS7). In these moments, failure was discussed only 
in relation to external actors; namely, the other portable ‘sniffer-dog’ projects funded 
under this EU scheme, or industry efforts to produce a similar device (SE1).  
Amidst these efforts to displace, judge and compare, there was one figure that 
operated as an uncontested standard for failure: the actual sniffer dog (Bourne, Johnson 
& Lisle, 2015: 319). Throughout the construction of the device, scientists and engineers 
often asked – sometimes rhetorically, but always with a great deal of concern – whether 
their sensor was faster, more accurate and more efficient than a living, working sniffer 
dog aiding customs and immigration agents at the border (MOBS4; MOBS7; ENDU1; 
MREF3). I found this anxiety intriguing because of the enormous force-from-a-distance 
these furry creatures exerted, and how that determined the thresholds of Handhold’s 
sensors. There were many amusing moments when I witnessed world-leading scientists 
and engineers completely unravel when trying to match the sniffing capabilities of 
friendly cocker spaniels and Labrador retrievers. What struck me was how this ‘perfect 
canine nose’ could only work for the scientists and engineers if they isolated the dog’s 
sniffing capacity from the complex, entangled and co-dependent choreography that 
actually unfolds when dogs work alongside customs and immigration officers at 
borders. In other border ethnographies I have done, it is clear that a dog’s sensory 
capabilities operate in conjunction with the skills of the trainer, the dog-trainer 
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relationship, the material infrastructure of the border itself (e.g. baggage belts; luggage 
retrieval areas), the pre-given data directing the search, and the institutional history of 
sniffer dog programmes (Treating People as Objects, 2016). What became clear in my 
observations of Handhold was that all these entanglements were effaced by the 
scientists and engineers’ desire to isolate the nose of the dog as a static and quantifiable 
threshold against which they could judge the success or failure of their sensors. In other 
words, ‘as long as we are better than an actual dog’.  
What this complex sequencing of displacement, judgement, competition and 
projection reveals is that no matter how vigorously the consensus over instructive 
failure is policed, it is always disrupted by the diverse, unruly and often antagonistic 
experiences of failure that circulate through everyday scientific practice, professional 
cultures, technical discussions and partner negotiations. No matter how diligently the 
scientists and engineers of Handhold tried to obey the dictates of instructive failure, 
they could not extricate themselves from the messy, unordered and contingent nature of 
scientific research that includes non-productive, useless and tangential avenues of 
inquiry. No matter how diplomatically they tried to negotiate the competing thresholds 
of failure circulating between different professional cultures, these antagonisms actually 
informed the rate of progress and shaped the material components of the device itself. 
What this shows us is that to hold scientific research collaborations together, 
participants have to perform an instructive account of failure over and over again as a 
way to mask its contingency, disavow its non-productive formations and discipline 
competing understandings held by different actors. Indeed, that performance is central 
to failing better.  
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Speculative Failure: the informal practices of de-risking 
The scientists and engineers of Handhold tussled with the instructive account of 
failure governing the project through a mixture of obedience, performance, disruption 
and resistance which, at least initially, did not appear to be co-ordinated. However, as I 
observed their daily work and watched the idiosyncratic ‘progress’ of Handhold from 
idea to prototype, I began to notice very sophisticated strategies being used to mitigate 
against the device’s potential failures. The Handhold participants revealed an acute 
awareness of the multiplicities of potential device failure, and through their informal 
practices of de-risking they demonstrated highly creative, adaptive and surprising ways 
to produce something recognizable as ‘success’. That a lively world of failures was 
revealed through practices of de-risking should come as no surprise. Failure absolutely 
constitutes risk: it is the very thing to be avoided, and therefore the driving force of all 
forms of risk assessment, management and mitigation.  We know, of course, that 
techniques of risk management are ubiquitous in modern life, and it is therefore 
unsurprising that Handhold’s initial funding bid included an official strategy of risk-
management. Here, the architects of the bid distinguished between technical risks that 
arise from working with dangerous substances (e.g. biological toxins; radioactive 
material) and social risks that arise from communicating classified material to 
geographically distant partners. These two risk categories were explicitly named in the 
bid document precisely because they were easily solved by well-established institutional 
safeguards and procedures. For example, the industry and university laboratories 
working with dangerous substances were already equipped with trained staff and the 
proper health and safety procedures to prevent technological failures (e.g. radiation, 
burns, contamination), and all participants understood the need to encrypt all data 
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shared between partners to prevent the social risks of information leakage (e.g. 
classified material reaching ‘the bad guys’). The familiarity of these risks, and the well-
established methods of addressing them, meant that Handhold’s official risk 
management strategy was both meaningless for the participants (i.e. the named 
procedures were already an established part of their daily practice), as well as useless in 
terms of specific guidance (i.e. it did not acknowledge the actual risks that emerged in 
the day-to-day development of the device). As many Handhold participants admitted, 
the official risk management strategy produced at the proposal stage was a ‘form-filling 
exercise’ that had very little impact on the project itself (GOV2; SE2).  
This does not mean, however, that risk management was absent on the project. 
In the early stages of Handhold, I witnessed a very complex set of negotiations in which 
scientists and engineers navigated through the plural possibilities of risk and failure in 
the following way: by assuming that Plan A would undoubtedly fail, they constantly 
‘de-risked’ by simultaneously working on multiple trajectories of research – not just 
Plan B, but also Plans C, D and E all at the same time. As one scientist / engineer 
explained, ‘You cannot wait for it [Plan A] to fail’ (SE8) but instead must proceed in 
one direction with multiple experimental trajectories constantly at work in the 
background. Certain partners even formalized this multiple-track approach by fully 
developing two different sensors at the same time, knowing full well that only one 
would eventually be used (SE18; SE19; SE21; SE15). Instead of the singular, ordered 
and highly focused story of scientific research retroactively produced by an instructive 
account of failure, I witnessed an official research plan (Plan A) that was highly 
provisional, and a very sophisticated process by which scientists and engineers tinkered 
with it, adapted it, and re-tooled it by incorporating aspects from the multiple research 
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trajectories they were simultaneously developing (e.g. Plans B→E). I was struck by the 
energy, time and commitment that scientists and engineers gave to these alternative 
research trajectories: they were not neglected in the background as unloved second 
choices, but instead played an active role in shaping the research trajectory that the 
Handhold device eventually took. What most surprised me about these de-risking 
practices was the inexplicable way in which scientists and engineers arranged the best 
outcome from all these ‘live’ possibilities. As one scientist / engineer explained, this 
was not about rational calculation, but rather produced by ‘gut feelings’ and ‘black 
magic’ (SE23).  
The clearest practice of de-risking involved decisions about whether to use 
mature or undeveloped technology in different aspects of the device. For example, many 
work packages relied on already well-established technologies in one area so that 
scientists and engineers were free to devote their attention to more ‘risky’ areas of 
research. Thus, Handhold participants agreed to use a reliable Open-Source operating 
system and a well-established computer chip – widely-used technologies that were 
easily adapted with the help of online communities – so they could pursue more 
innovative developments (SE2; SE5; MOBS1). Deploying mature technology as a de-
risking strategy was particularly clear in the sensor development process: most work-
packages had ‘off-the shelf’ sensors ready for use in case the more innovative 
developments did not work (SE2). These negotiations between mature and undeveloped 
technology produced two surprising and highly imaginative accounts of failure. First, 
scientists and engineers offered a number of inventive, detailed and sometimes highly 
creative speculations about the possible reasons why a ‘new’ or ‘old’ sensor might fail 
(e.g. human error, blocked Wifi signal, dirt, temperature, moisture). These discussions 
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continued at every phase of device development as they unearthed new possibilities for 
failure to add to the growing list (MOBS1; MOBS7). Second, these discussions about 
multiple potential failures were bounded by an energetic focus on the ‘worst-case’ 
scenario which was explored in great detail and with much intensity. This narrative was 
not the domain of the pessimist, but rather functioned positively to give structure to the 
numerous and proliferating possibilities of failure that the device generated. Trafficking 
between these two speculative imaginaries of failure revealed the scientists and 
engineers at their most flexible and adaptive. Complex discussions about (a) the 
increasing multiplicities of potential failure, and (b) the endlessly rich texture of the 
‘worst-case’ scenario, actively informed their concrete decisions to get the sensors 
working and integrated into the device.  
Those engagements with speculative failure became darker and much more 
ponderous when scientists and engineers acknowledged that some risks (and therefore 
some potential failures) are unknowable (SE2). Many times I witnessed complex 
disaggregations into known-knowns, unknown-knowns, known-unknowns, and the real 
problem, unknown-unknowns. I was impressed by the quiet and serious way the 
scientists and engineers acknowledged the presence of the unknown in their work: they 
may not know what to do about unknown-unknowns, but they recognize this category 
exists and they make room for it in their thinking and practice. For me, this respectful 
attunement to the unknown was the most palpable way that the scientists and engineers 
kept their research open to possibility, and in doing so, actively resisted an instructive 
account of failure. Indeed, the unknown never appears in the Dyson narrative’s litany of 
instructive failures that prepare the ground for the eventual success. Recognizing the 
presence of the unknown threatens the progressive linearity of that story and disrupts its 
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account of scientific practice as dogged, relentless graft in pursuit of a known and 
valuable goal (e.g. a bag-less vacuum cleaner). Certainly the Handhold scientists and 
engineers worked extremely hard, but their thoughtful musings about the unknown 
revealed how such labour is constituted by deep philosophical and existential reflection 
that cannot be stuffed into a sanitized story of scientific progress. For me, the Handhold 
participants’ thoughtful considerations of the unknown exemplified the kind of 
‘unproductive’ activities that get written out of the Dyson narrative.  
Such existential musings about the unknown contrasted sharply with the 
frenzied predictions that dominated the lead up to Handhold’s prototype demonstration 
(MOBS6). Despite a collective effort to de-risk for the day itself (including successful 
dry runs at the test site), scientists and engineers were frantically trying to predict what 
would go wrong during the demonstration, observe any potential risks they hadn’t 
spotted, recalibrate probability, and invent pre-emptive explanations for what they felt 
would be inevitable failure. In these moments of high stress, there was no sense in 
which the demonstration would actually succeed; instead, all participants operated with 
an assumption that something would definitely go wrong. Indeed, while setting up for 
the demonstration, a failure in software integration stopped the entire device from 
working – an unforeseen error which, thanks to the intense work of two researchers, was 
corrected before the EU funders arrived (MOBS6). What struck me about the prototype 
demonstration was how real failure was for everyone involved: it acted, influenced and 
changed behaviour. This was not the comfortable situation of ‘failing better’ in the 
safety of Silicon Valley, but instead a palpable fear that either they had not sufficiently 
imagined all the potential scenarios of device failure (which meant that something 
unforeseen would emerge during the test and embarrass everyone), or they had not 
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successfully chosen the right (i.e. most instructive) pathway out of all the potential risks 
and failures identified (which meant that one of their alternative research trajectories 
from Plans B→E would suddenly emerge as the ‘real’ trajectory). At precisely the 
moment when the lively landscape of potential failures had to be contained in front of 
the project funders, they burst forth in the anxiety and panic of the Handhold 
participants. For me, there was something reassuring in the ill-timed appearance of 
failure’s multiplicity at the prototype demonstration: for a brief period before the test, 
scientists and engineers were unable to perform failure as instructive. Instead, they were 
forced to inhabit the subterranean world of multiple, diverse and contradictory failures 
that felt threatening and uncontrollable rather than instructive. 
As the Handhold project developed, I became interested in how these 
imaginative and sometimes uncomfortable practices of de-risking operated through tacit 
knowledge, assumed norms and shared understandings. Acknowledging Pink’s (2015) 
warning that these silent atmospheres of affect, culture and non-verbal interaction are 
methodologically tricky to explore, I was able to sense some of their power in the way 
the expertise, experience, professional reputations and institutional positions of the 
Handhold participants shaped decisions about risk and failure. For example, those 
individuals with more experience (especially experience ‘in the industry’ as opposed to 
just academia) were considered better able to identify potential failures, judge their 
severity, and instigate de-risking practices. This reliance on the authority of a particular 
kind of expert to name and navigate potential failures is important because it reveals 
how wider constructions of power such as gender and seniority operate in collaborative 
research projects (GOV2). In Handhold, I reflected on these constructions of power as I 
observed how PhD students and Post-Doctoral researchers were (or were not) integrated 
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into the informal, tacit and often unacknowledged way that potential risks and failures 
were navigated. In any institutional setting, hierarchical relationships of supervision and 
mentorship are one of the primary mechanisms through which tacit knowledge, 
assumed norms and shared understandings are transmitted, so if the mentoring 
relationship is not working, junior researchers might not pick up on informal 
understandings that seem so commonplace for more established researchers. In 
Handhold, I became interested in moments when the implicit understandings of risk and 
failure operative on the project were not shared – when the tacit, unspoken and inferred 
norms appeared to break down or were misunderstood by participants. For example, 
when a new target substance emerged part-way through the project there was a 
discussion as to which sensor would be responsible for its detection. Because senior 
scholars had the political, social and professional skills to avoid taking on such a risky 
last-minute addition, the task fell to an inexperienced team of junior researchers. When 
difficulties over this sensor inevitably emerged at a subsequent consortia meeting (i.e. 
when the spectre of failure reared its head) the junior researchers were heavily 
criticized. Unlike senior scholars, the junior researchers could not reassure the project 
participants that their wealth of experience would help them overcome these difficulties 
(MOBS3; MOBS4; MOBS6). I was struck by the skill with which senior researchers 
were able to mobilize tacit knowledge, assumed norms and shared understandings to 
avoid a difficult technological problem. This suggested that junior and more 
inexperienced researchers were not as effectively integrated into Handhold’s silent 
register of shared perception, and were therefore unable to map their specific 
understandings of risk and failure onto those operative in the wider project. The 
problem, here, is that the stakes for junior researchers are potentially career-ending. 
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Unlike senior scholars who can weather reputational damage, the failure of a whole 
project means that PhD students are at risk of failing their Viva exams, and Post-
Doctoral scholars are at risk of having their funding cut and their positions 
discontinued.  
I was not surprised by the lack of force exerted by Handhold’s formal risk 
management strategy outlined in the bid: risk management as a technique of governance 
has become so institutionalized that it bears no resemblance to the actual risks that arise 
in everyday working practices. But what did surprise me was the force with which more 
heterogeneous understandings and experiences of failure made themselves felt, 
particularly through informal de-risking practices and during the stressful preparation 
for the prototype demonstration. These examples suggest that the single trajectory of 
‘experiment →fail →adapt →learn →re-try →succeed’ underscoring the Dyson 
narrative (i.e. what is retrospectively told as an uncontested Plan A) is only ever 
constituted by a multiplicity of alternative trajectories that are kept alive throughout the 
development phase (i.e. Plans B→E). More to the point, which bits end up populating 
the final trajectory of the device (Plan A) and which bits don’t (Plans B→E) is not the 
result of calculated and inflexible risk management protocols. Rather, ‘success’ is much 
more about the creative, speculative and highly imaginative art of de-risking than it is 
about linear and logical scientific discovery.  
 
Re-Routing Failure: the detours of creativity and innovation  
Unlike the scientists and engineers who responded to my queries about failure 
with confusion and avoidance (SE1, SE2, SE6, SE7, SE8), the EU and UK government 
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figures involved in exploring science in a security context offered highly reflexive 
accounts of what failure is, what it means, and how we might understand it better.3 
More comfortable thinking about success rather than failure, they often framed 
discussions about technology development with thoughtful ruminations about ‘what 
counts as good’, ‘what does good look like?’, and ‘what counts as good enough?’ 
(GOV1) For me, one of the most intriguing statements from a government figure was a 
rather forlorn observation that scientists and engineers were not very good at failure: 
‘we have failed to specify what failure is’, and more importantly, ‘we don’t learn our 
lessons well’ (GOV6). Unlike the Handhold scientists and engineers who struggled to 
interpret my interest in failure, senior government figures welcomed efforts to think 
more specifically, coherently and deeply about it. While I was initially excited by 
provocative challenges such as ‘what is failure composed of?’ (GOV6), I quickly 
realized that these questions were always posed instrumentally: the goal was to make 
scientists and engineers better at failure by teaching them to learn the right lessons in 
the right ways (i.e. isolating and encouraging only ‘instructive’ forms of failure). On 
reflection, this instrumental approach was apparent in the tone of lament that framed 
their philosophical musings (i.e. why are we so bad at this? Why don’t we understand 
it?) What I came to realize in these interactions was that government figures were 
actively and enthusiastically reproducing precisely the problem I was trying to expose – 
that instructive forms of failure are limiting and depoliticizing because they pre-
emptively constrain what it is possible to know, learn and discover.   
                                                            
3 By ‘government figures’ here, I mean the EU scientists, engineers and managers who had oversight for 
all the scientific consortia, including Handhold, that were funded under the Horizon 2020 scheme, as 
well as the UK‐based scientists and engineers based in the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
(DSTL) who were directly involved in all the projects funded under the ESRC’s Science and Security 
theme and who liaised directly with our TRUST project. 
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Of particular interest for me was the way government figures sought to frame 
instructive failure in entrepreneurial terms. All Handhold participants and managers 
understood themselves to be playing ‘catch up’ with small start-ups and big tech 
corporations who operate with a ‘fail fast, fail early, fail often’ mind set. Indeed, UK 
government figures were unapologetic about their need to learn big tech’s focus on 
creativity, innovation, collaboration, experimentation and ‘blue-skies thinking’ as a way 
to harness failure’s productive capacities (GOV1; GOV2; GOV3; GOV4). Absolutely 
central to this understanding is the belief that instructive failure produces innovation. 
Indeed, UK government figures recognize that the traditionally inflexible institutional 
settings of scientific research and development make it very difficult to explore the 
creative avenues that lead to innovation, in part because of a pervasive fear of failure. 
For this reason, they are developing more ‘risk-free’ opportunities and ‘safe spaces’ for 
researchers to pursue creative impulses, indulge hunches, think laterally (‘outside the 
box’) and imagine technology outside of its normal limitations without the threat of 
destroyed reputations or career demotion (GOV3; GOV4). These figures spoke 
animatedly and excitedly about the kinds of innovations that might result if creative 
thinking were allowed to flourish openly in the laboratory (GOV3; GOV4; GOV6). 
Throughout all this energetic talk, it became clear that a constitutive tension lay at the 
heart of this pursuit of innovation: on the one hand, it is necessary to foster creative 
thinking because this will eventually produce the kind of instructive failure that leads to 
innovation; on the other hand, fostering creative thinking is risky because it produces so 
many non-productive failures that never result in innovation. What about all those 
creative endeavours that remain on the laboratory floor? Is it really OK to produce that 
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much failure in the pursuit of innovation? Or is there a threshold where too much failure 
cannot be sustained?  
For me, these non-productive failures left in the wake of ‘successful’ innovation 
became the absent presence that haunted the development of Handhold. I saw it most 
clearly when scientists and engineers revealed how much pressure they felt to produce 
innovative research, and the mixture of apprehension and terror they felt at the 
possibility that their research would be pointless because it did not lead to anything new 
or ground-breaking. This burden of innovation shaped all participants who expended 
enormous energy trying to make their part of the device more ‘cutting edge’ in 
comparison with both specific research in other Handhold work packages, and more 
general research in their particular scientific field (e.g. optics; software; sensors) (SE9; 
SE15; SE19; SE21; SE22; MOBS1; MOBS4). For me, this pressure is indicative of a 
much wider (and much more concerning) transformation in which the drive for 
innovation requires a wholesale capture of the contingent and often haphazard process 
of knowledge production. Any idea, hunch, tangent, daydream, distraction, playful 
moment, lapse of focus or spontaneous interaction is coded in advance as potentially 
creative, and thus has the capacity to produce an instructive failure that will lead to 
innovation. Here, failure is both everywhere and nowhere: if every creative impulse is 
potentially an instructive failure that will result in innovation, then it cannot be 
considered a failure.  
What concerns me about this drive for innovation is how big tech companies 
(and the governments and universities chasing them) are using it to transform the norms 
of everyday scientific practice in ways that strip practitioners, experts, students and 
scholars of their agency. For example, in order to capture the lucrative potential of 
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instructive failure, big tech companies must put the entire lives of their employees under 
surveillance because creative impulses could arise anywhere, at any time. The 
pernicious reach of this creativity-failure-innovation nexus is exemplified by the 
Googleplex campus in Mountain View California where there are free meals, free 
haircuts, swim-in-place pools, games rooms, pianos, a gym and sleep pods. These 
‘perks’ encourage employees to spend more and more of their non-labouring life in the 
Googleplex so they can increase ‘creativity and teamwork’. But as Fuchs & Trotter 
(2013:38-39) argue, this ‘playification of work’ and ‘workification of play’ mean that 
the Googleplex operates like a giant laboratory where every idea, behaviour and 
interaction is constantly under surveillance by a company that mines its employees’ 
creative impulses 24/7 (see also Fuchs, 2011). To identify those embryonic ideas that 
will most likely result in instructive failure (and therefore lucrative innovation), Google 
creates the conditions for unscripted events to occur (e.g. an off-hand comment during a 
table tennis game; a ‘eureka’ moment on a treadmill; a dream in a sleep pod), and then 
captures, develops and hopefully monetizes them. Because these events emerge in the 
domains of leisure, relaxation, self-care and everyday life (rather than during the 
repetitive grind of routine coding), Google creates the conditions in which all aspects of 
an employee’s life are available for the company to access, develop, utilize and own. 
Indeed, the price of working at one of the world’s biggest tech firms is total surrender: 
all your ideas, behaviours and interactions are pressed into service supporting Google’s 
relentless search for creative thinking and instructive failure which they can turn into 
lucrative innovation (Ross, 2015; Walker, 2011)  
How are we supposed to think about failure when every single idea, hunch or 
tangent is coded in advance as potentially innovative? Who decides which ideas have 
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the capacity to be instructive failures and therefore ripe for innovation, and which are 
considered non-productive, irrelevant and useless? The recent interest in failure by 
governments and universities appears inclusive because it makes failure ubiquitous: all 
creative ideas – even the craziest and most likely to fail – are valid because they might 
lead to instructive failure that will eventually result in innovation. In this context, it 
appears that failure has been made impossible: it has completely disappeared from the 
epistemological horizon. If something doesn’t work, or mistakes are made, or 
collaborations fall apart – all these can be written off as failed efforts to innovate. But 
what this inclusive tone masks, of course, is the emergence of a new consensus that 
forces all scientific endeavour – even the most speculative – to be explicitly productive. 
In other words, you cannot fail for failure’s sake: you must fail in the service of 
innovation. What this does, of course, is constrain creative thinking in precisely the 
ways that were supposed to be avoided. ‘Thinking outside the box’ is the new norm: it 
is contained within a newer, shinier and more entrepreneurial box labelled ‘innovation’ 
which is much more pernicious than its predecessors because it operates through the 
frames of openness, inclusivity and diversity. This attachment of instructive failure to 
the pathway of innovation is extremely problematic because it limits those possibilities 
of research deemed to be most speculative and cutting-edge. The result of this capture is 
that we are unable to explore whether alternative experiences of failure – those that are 
not explicitly productive – might lead to a different kind of innovation altogether.   
 
Unlearning Failure: 
What became clear in the development of the Handhold device was that the 
difficult, awkward, painful experiences of failure that could not be handcuffed to the 
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progressive narrative of ‘experiment →fail →adapt →learn →re-try →succeed’ were 
disavowed in a way that reduced failure to mere utility. Failure was only ‘instructive’ 
when it resulted in success, and more importantly, innovation. This narrowly 
instrumental way of understanding failure stems, in part, from an over-reliance on 
traditional scientific methods of quantification. Failure is something to be isolated, 
captured, disaggregated, measured, managed and put to work, which requires the kind 
of dispositions that are capable of instrumentalizing the world in this way. I witnessed 
the force of this thinking in the wide-spread consensus within Handhold about the kinds 
of instructive failures that would enable participants to reach their agreed goal of 
creating an innovative portable security device that would help stop the movement of 
dangerous substances across borders. While this consensus required participants to 
ignore, displace or jettison the difficult, awkward and unruly experiences of failure that 
did not directly contribute to this goal, they were ultimately unable to do so. Indeed, the 
project was haunted by all those uncomfortable and useless failures that littered their 
laboratories, intensified their anxieties, and kept disrupting their efforts to secure a clean 
and progressive pathway from instructive failure → success.  
I want to argue that by paying closer attention to those disavowed experiences of 
failure that I saw haunting the construction of the Handhold device, we can start to 
unlearn this dominant trajectory of instructive failure that constrains scientific research. 
The first step in this unlearning process is to engage more intensely with STS thinkers 
who open up vital intellectual spaces where the multiplicities of failure can be studied in 
the context of a wider critical re-imagining of science. For example, does the complex 
world of failure I discovered on the Handhold project align with Parisi’s (2013) 
formulation of error, indeterminacy and blind spots that constitute algorithmic decision 
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making? Do my observations about the speculative imaginaries of de-risking speak to 
ideas about uncertainty within Quantum theory, and could this help us re-calibrate the 
reductive success / failure logic (Barad, 2007; Stengers, 2011)? For me, STS’s 
deconstruction of the objectivity and instrumentality of science is a necessary starting 
point if we are to further trouble the Dyson narrative and discover all the other lively 
forms of failure that operate during scientific thinking and practice. The second part of 
this unlearning process involves paying more attention to the critical explorations of 
failure that have been developing in the creative arts. For curator Lisa Le Feuvre (2010: 
13, 19) a much richer, deeper and more vibrant account of failure has been animating 
visual artists for decades:  
When failure is released from being a judgemental term, and success 
deemed overrated, the embrace of failure can become an act of 
bravery, of daring to go beyond normal practices and enter a realm of 
not-knowing… In this uncertain and beguiling space, between the two 
subjective poles of success and failure, where paradox rules, where 
transgressive activities can refuse dogma and surety, it is here, surely, 
that failure can be celebrated (see also Buckley, 2015). 
From this starting point, my engagements with the Handhold project can be understood 
as a process of uncovering how this ‘uncertain and beguiling space’ played a 
constitutive part in the development of the device. Given that every aspect of the 
scientific research process was about closing this space down, disavowing it and 
moving forward in a singular, linear and progressive fashion, it is unsurprising that I 
found this much more difficult than I had initially expected.  
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In the clinical, ordered and calculative world of science, what is written out of 
the Dyson narrative is failure’s emotional punch, what Werry & O’Gorman (2012: 106) 
describe as the ‘familiar, bleak, heavy vacancy, that bottom-punched-out-of-my-world 
emptiness.’ Failure is painful – it is awful and agonizing and can’t easily be put into 
words – which is why it is so quickly disavowed and replaced by the highly disciplining 
practices of rational calculation, mature deliberation and ‘gentlemanly’ consideration. 
By acknowledging failure in all its awful, painful and uncontrollable fury, these creative 
imaginings help disaggregate it into its many different emotional components (e.g. 
shame, embarrassment, disgrace, vulnerability, humiliation and exposure). At the 
Institute of Failure, a collective that includes thinkers from the fine arts, economics, 
computing, architecture and performance, failure is always understood in its 
multiplicity: at a minimum, it is constituted by 26 alternative states including 
Uselessness, Embarassment, Incoherence, Absurdity and Distractability’ (Etchells & 
Goulish, 2001). I found this disaggregation enormously helpful as I tried to puzzle 
through the different ways that Handhold scientists and engineers addressed (or did not 
address) the emotional landscape of failure. Certainly there was anxiety about damaged 
reputations and career advancement, but there was also shame and embarrassment over 
lack of progress, aggressive forms of projection and displacement, and melancholy 
articulations of futility. None of this, of course, is captured by the supposedly resilient 
scientist who reflects rationally on her errors, learns from her mistakes and produces 
successful adaptations. In performing the Dyson narrative, this scientist might also feel 
shame, panic, paranoia helplessness, despair and humiliation, but none of these are 
represented in the final story. What is also absent from that singular narrative is the 
possibility that failure might be a pleasurable experience. As Nick Ridout (2006: 77-79) 
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has explained with respect to the failures of theatre, audiences secretly want something 
to go wrong on stage so they can fully experience the affective resonance of a live 
performance. When the bourgeoisie norms of theatre fall apart – when animals don’t 
behave, when someone gets stage fright, when an actor ‘corpses’ or gets the giggles – 
the resulting excitement and anxiety on the part of the audience becomes a perverse 
kind of anticipated pleasure (Ridout, 2006: 71). Given the apparent ubiquity of failure in 
the everyday work of the Handhold scientists and engineers, I began to wonder whether 
they actually enjoyed the ever-present sensations of collapse, crisis, panic and chaos.    
 Paying attention to the multiple emotional states of failure is important because 
it disrupts and re-orders the linear temporality of the Dyson narrative. Instructive failure 
assumes that a chosen trajectory of research is rationally arrived at and fully executed 
before it fails and undergoes adaptation. None of this forward-moving energy explains 
the failure to produce anything at all, or the discarded projects that never get off the 
ground. Artist Tim Etchells explores these embryonic failures in his long running 
collection of ‘Apologies and Un-Made’ shows: ‘a performative graveyard for failed, 
unproductive and unworkable ideas’ (Etchells, 2002). Similarly, Sarah Jane Bailes 
(2002; 2010) uses the experience of distraction – of being taken away from the task at 
hand – to reflect on the feelings of underachievement that emerge in the distance 
between your dream and your failure to achieve it. Along with considering those 
embryonic and aborted failures, creative artists also help us extend the duration of 
failure’s occurrence so we can rest awhile in its painful grasp. If we are serious about 
contesting the relentless drive to only fail instructively, then we need to forcibly extend 
the duration of failure’s painful occurrence for longer than is normal or necessary. 
Inhabiting the ‘heavy vacancy’ of that painful duration is important because it prevents 
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the easy retrospective narration of failure as a necessary ‘hiccup in a predetermined 
route to success’ (Leese, 2015: 277). When failure refuses such a predetermined route 
and holds open the ground for alternative possibilities, it becomes an important political 
experience in its own right. This is precisely the purpose of the Institute of Failure who 
recast the story of human failure as ‘a kind of unspeakable beauty’ (Heathfield, 2001) 
that is both stubbornly permanent and irresolveable. Creative writers are particularly 
helpful here as they speak openly about how it feels to live with failure everyday. 
Novelist Anne Enright, for example, claims that ‘failure is what writers do. It is built 
in’; Will Self goes one step further in claiming that ‘all political lives end in failure, but 
all writing ones begin there, endure there, and then collapse into senescent incoherence’ 
(The Guardian, 2013: 4). What most energizes me about these creative re-imaginings of 
failure is their ability to bring back the original dark intent of Beckett’s claim to ‘fail 
better’ – an intent that can never be sanitized by shiny management slogans or 
entrepreneurial rhetoric. As novelist Ned Bauman (2012) brilliantly explains: ‘Watching 
a liturgy from such a gloomy and merciless author getting repurposed to cheer up mid-
level executives is like watching a neighbour clear out their gutters with a stick they 
found in the garden, not realizing the stick is in fact a human shinbone’. I came to see 
my explorations of Handhold as a kind of critical paleontology: digging up the 
shinbones of unwanted failure that the scientists, engineers and managers kept burying.  
 
Failing Worse: 
During my observations of the Handhold device, I read Allegra Goodman’s 
novel Intuition (2006) which explores how usually unspoken emotions emerge in the 
carefully regimented space of a cancer research lab. She exposes the human dramas that 
34 
 
unfold when an experiment with initially exciting results gradually implodes and results 
in failure. Goodman’s narrative spends a great deal of time in the laboratory itself, and 
shows how routine decisions made by scientists are shaped by a rich emotional 
landscape of excitement, doubt, envy, boredom, camaraderie, competition, lust, fear, 
exhaustion, isolation and distress. The denouement of the story is absolutely not about 
redemption or success, but instead involves the dismantling of a world-renowned 
laboratory team engulfed in disappointment, betrayal and failure. By usual narrative 
standards Goodman’s story is a tragedy, but I found it hugely inspirational precisely 
because she lets readers – especially non-scientists – see what we don’t usually see in 
conventional stories about scientific discovery. I am in no doubt that reading 
Goodman’s story shaped my own observations of the Handhold project, forced me to 
consider what remains hidden during the process of technology development, and gave 
me the confidence to ask rather unorthodox questions about the experience of failure in 
that process. Indeed, it was only by listening to insights from more explicitly creative 
formations like Goodman’s that I was able to see the powerful work that instructive 
failure was doing as the Handhold device was being constructed. On closer inspection, 
it became clear that failure really did have a life of its own in the Handhold project – a 
very rich, often circuitous and thoroughly poly-vocal life that refused to be fully 
disciplined or disavowed. No matter how powerful or comprehensive the attempts to 
make failure serve the pre-determined goals of success, it always slipped out from 
underneath. Paying attention to those slippages opened up a subterranean register of 
failure that was emotionally rich, temporally complex and sometimes painfully unruly. 
While this paper works through the particular case study of how failure operated 
on the Handhold project, it gestures to a number of issues that emerge in the 
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intersections of science, security and border technologies that require further 
investigation. First, the critical intent of this paper has been to demonstrate how an 
instructive account of failure governs scientific practice. While I have shown how the 
Dyson narrative is disrupted by more heterogeneous experiences of failure, I think more 
dedicated work is needed to specify, focus and develop the substance and texture of that 
heterogeneity. For example, are there more common forms of uselessness? Does a lack 
of productivity require particular affective attunements and emotional dispositions? 
When does uselessness emerge and disappear? Second, within the field of Critical 
Security Studies, we know that failure is constitutive of all types of risk analysis, 
assessment and management, but more work is needed to understand the tensions 
between risk and failure, how pre-emption and precaution govern the temporalities of 
failure (especially in the antecedent space of the laboratory), and whether non-rational, 
un-calculable and creative understandings of failure might reveal the limitations of risk 
analysis more acutely. Third, a great deal more critical attention is needed to show how 
the relentless pursuit of innovation curtails academic freedom, limits epistemological 
horizons, instrumentalizes knowledge production and disciplines the bodies, minds and 
behaviours of knowledge producers. Although I have argued for an enthusiastic 
engagement with critical STS scholars and creative artists who help us re-imagine 
failure, I worry that the same forces that have co-opted the energetic capacities of 
innovation will soon do the same to these fertile spaces of critical thinking. With this in 
mind, we need to be even more determined in revealing those multiple and often unruly 
experiences of failure that refuse to be made productive within the epistemological 
horizon of scientific research. All of this, of course, has implications for the decisions 
that are eventually made at the border with the aid of security technologies like 
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Handhold. I consider this intervention as a hopeful starting point that brings the 
antecedent register of security technology development into critical focus. What is 
needed are further explorations of how the closed logic of success / failure underscoring 
the Dyson narrative amplifies and strengthens the norm / deviant logic governing 
technologized border decisions. Does this alignment exacerbate pre-existing social 
exclusions such as race, gender, class and sexuality? How does the force of this 
alignment intensify at different parts of the border assemblage (e.g. the laboratory; the 
Cloud; the visa office; the border crossing)? Which bodies and objects 
disproportionately ‘fail’ to be included in the pre-generated category of normal? Where 
do deviations occur most frequently, where do they disappear, and who is affected by 
this? As this paper has argued, one way we can politicize failure in that elongated 
border space is to pay closer attention to the poly-vocal and heterogeneous experiences 
of failure that disrupt, contest and un-work reductive in/out border decisions. In our 
interrogations of border security technologies, then, we should not uncritically accept 
the sanitized stories of failing better; rather, we should have the courage to explore 
stories of failing worse in order to see what epistemological, material and political 
horizons they open up.  
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